The Post Office Horizon Scandal

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This is turning into a car crash for the post office, "the Post Office knew about bugs and errors in its Horizon accountancy software early on"



Fujitsu Europe's boss has admitted the firm has a "moral obligation" to contribute to compensation for sub-postmasters wrongly prosecuted as a result of its faulty IT software.
Paul Patterson said Fujitsu gave evidence to the Post Office which was used to prosecute innocent managers.
He added the Post Office knew about "bugs and errors" in its Horizon accountancy software early on.
It comes as victims of the scandal told MPs of problems receiving compensation.
Between 1999 and 2015, more than 900 sub-postmasters and postmistresses were prosecuted for theft and false accounting after money appeared to be missing from their branches, but the prosecutions were based on evidence from faulty Horizon software.
Some sub-postmasters wrongfully went to prison, many were financially ruined. Some have since died.
It has been described as the most widespread miscarriage of justice in British history, but to date only 93 convictions have been overturned and thousands of people are still waiting for compensation settlements more than 20 years on.
Appearing before MPs on the Business and Trade select committee on Tuesday:
  • Fujitsu's Mr Patterson said his "gut feel" was that staff at the company knew about problems with Horizon before 2010
  • Post Office chief executive Nick Read, said he could not give an exact date when the Post Office knew the IT system could be accessed remotely
  • Both Mr Patterson and Mr Read frustrated MPs who criticised a lack of answers and knowledge of the events
  • Jo Hamilton, a victim in the scandal, told MPs she felt like she being treated like a criminal during the process to get compensation
  • Lord Arbuthnot said it was essential for victims, some of which are "living hand to mouth" to get money as soon as possible
  • Solicitor Neil Hudgell said only three off his group of 77 wrongly convicted sub-postmasters had received full and final compensation.
Mr Patterson apologised for Fujitsu's role in what he said was an "appalling miscarriage of justice", and admitted the company had been "involved from the very start".
"We did have bugs and errors in the system and we did help the Post Office in their prosecutions of the sub-postmasters," he said. "For that we are truly sorry."
Asked why Fujitsu didn't do anything about glitches in the Horizon system when the company knew about them at an early stage, Mr Patterson said: "I don't know. I really don't know."
He added: "On a personal level I wish I did know. Following my appointment in 2019 I have looked back on those situations for the company and the evidence I have seen and I just don't know."
Nick Read, the chief executive of the Post Office, appeared alongside Mr Patterson in front of MPs.
He was criticised for having not provided information to the committee with key events in the timeline, such as when the Post Office first knew that remote access to sub-postmasters' Horizon systems was possible.
When prosecutions were taking place, Fujitsu had told the Post Office that no-one, apart from sub-postmasters themselves, could access or alter Horizon records - meaning the blame for mistakes could only rest with sub-postmasters, but that turned out to be untrue.
"You must surely have had time in four years [since joining the Post Office] to cut to the heart of this issue, which is: when did the Post Office know remote access to terminals was possible?" said Labour MP Liam Byrne, chair of the committee.
"I couldn't give you an exact date on that," replied Mr Read.

Delays​

Earlier, Neil Hudgell, a solicitor representing 400 people directly affected by the scandal and 77 sub-postmasters wrongly convicted by the Post Office, told MPs that just three people had been paid full and final compensation.
He said layers of bureaucracy, along with certain requests by the Post Office, were causing problems in victims securing financial redress.
"I am not sure enough resource is thrown at it, in terms the right resource in the right areas. Routinely with the overturned conviction cases, it's taken three to four months to get a response to routine correspondence," he said.
In some cases, he said requests had been made for documents that were held in Post Office branches that clients had been locked out of some 15 to 20 years ago.
"We need to give the sub-postmasters the benefit of the doubt on key matters," Mr Hudgell said.

'Bogged down'​

Jo Hamilton, who was wrongfully convicted of stealing £36,000 from the village Post Office she ran in Hampshire in 2006, said getting compensation "almost like you're being retried".
"It just goes on and on and on," she told the committee.
Alan Bates, the campaigning former sub-postmaster at the centre of the ITV drama Mr Bates Vs The Post Office which has thrust the issue back into the spotlight, said that compensation was "bogged down" and the pace of processing claims was "madness".
He said his own compensation process was hampered by delays.
"I think it was 53 days before they asked three very simple questions," he said. "And there's no transparency behind it, which is even more frustrating," he said. "We do not know what's happening to these cases once they disappear in there."
Mr Read, who joined the Post Office in 2019, admitted there was a "culture of denial" behind the organisation dragging its feet over compensation payments.
"I think that the most important cultural challenge that I have in my organisation is to ensure that everybody in the organisation sees and understands absolutely what has been going on."
Post Office minister Kevin Hollinrake welcomed the suggestion that the Post Office would seek to make the compensation process simpler.
He told the committee that he wanted to reduce the amount of bureaucracy involved, but acknowledged there were "a lot of moving parts" with the various compensation schemes.
"No amount of compensation can ever make good completely [what victims went through]," he said.
"I think it's incumbent on all of us involved in this process to try and accelerate every part of the process."
Separate to Tuesday's hearing, an inquiry into the scandal is ongoing.

BBC News
 
I see they even edited witness statements, i am sorry but these feckers who did this need to be jailed and lose their pensions and any other perks they get, there is no way they should be able to walk away
 
Coverage this week has been very interesting - and a telling example of how dense many MPs are, and how dense or disingenuous the mainstream media is - i watched a lot of the hearings and the following subtleties and ambiguities - which are critical to the questions of accountability and liability - have been largely ignored. To take 3 examples:

- "they knew from the start that the system had bugs" - can someone find me a public sector system that didnt have bugs when it went live ? The key issues here are (i) when did Fujitsu and PO know that there were bugs that could dramatically affect the balances of sub postmasters and cause significant shortfalls ? and (ii) once PO did know this, did they carry on with further prosecutions as an attempt to cover it up ? If (ii) happened, then the execs who signed off on the prosecutions should absolutley face jail.

- "Fujitsu agree to compensate sub postmasters" - if you watch the hearing (or read a publication like the FT) what the regional Fujitsu CEO actually said was that they agreed to "contribute to" the compensation and expected the inquiry to determine their relative liability compared to the PO. That (entirely reasonable) position has been largely ignored by the idiots and charlatans in the MSM.

- "Fujitsu witness statements were altered" - this is obviously an outrage but I have not found any coverage of who altered them and when. That's the critical question here. In my frustration at reading the coverage perhaps I missed it - maybe someone can enlighten me.

The reason this matters is that, only when these subtleties are understood with the sub postmasters be compensated, and those who are guilty held to account. The longer these ambiguities are allowed to persist, the less likely it is that the perpetrators will be prosecuted. This is exactly what happened with the police conduct at Hillsborough - to the great distress of the grieving families. It's a classic public sector cover up tactic, and the MPs and media fall for it hook, line, sinker and copy of the Angling Times.
 
(ii) once PO did know this, did they carry on with further prosecutions as an attempt to cover it up ? If (ii) happened, then the execs who signed off on the prosecutions should absolutley face jail.
I agree with all of MattH1973's post above but...

Linked to the part quoted above, didn't a Fujitsu employee say this week that they provided evidence to assist the PO with the prosecutions when both the PO and Fujitsu knew that the system had bugs in it and the data upon which the prosecutions were based was flawed? Prosecutions were still ongoing in 2015. Why the hell didn't someone either at Fujitsu or the PO shout out that they had to pause the prosecutions as the evidence was flawed?
 
Linked to the part quoted above, didn't a Fujitsu employee say this week that they provided evidence to assist the PO with the prosecutions when both the PO and Fujitsu knew that the system had bugs in it and the data upon which the prosecutions were based was flawed? Prosecutions were still ongoing in 2015. Why the hell didn't someone either at Fujitsu or the PO shout out that they had to pause the prosecutions as the evidence was flawed?

They knew - "The Post Office’s Horizon IT system should “never have seen the light of day”
(I posted this article on page #2 of this thread)

Fujitsu bosses knew about Post Office Horizon IT flaws, says insider

A former senior developer who worked for Fujitsu on the Post Office IT system that led to subpostmasters being falsely accused of fraud, has claimed bosses knew of fundamental flaws before going
"The Post Office’s Horizon IT system should “never have seen the light of day” and bosses at supplier Fujitsu allowed it to be rolled out into the Post Office network despite being told it was not fit for purpose, according to a senior developer who worked on the project before it went live.


“Everybody in the building by the time I got there knew it was a bag of s**t”, he said. “It had gone through the test labs God knows how many times, and the testers were raising bugs by the thousand.”

The senior developer said he was contracted to work on the Horizon project between 1998 and 2000, at one point holding the job title Horizon Epos [electronic point of sale] development manager. He has asked to remain anonymous, but is prepared to give sworn witness statements to solicitors acting for subpostmasters in their ongoing appeals against past convictions.

The developer has also asked Computer Weekly to pass his contact details to the government’s Post Office Horizon IT inquiry, chaired by former High Court judge Wyn Williams.

Senior managers were aware

The most serious allegation raised by the developer is that senior managers at Fujitsu were aware that an important element of the Horizon system did not function correctly and could not be fixed.

For the first 10 years of Horizon’s existence, transaction and account data was stored on terminals in each branch before being uploaded to a central database via ISDN. Our source says this part of the system simply did not work.

“The cash account was a piece of software that sat on the counter NT box, asleep all day,” he said. “At the end of the day, or a particular point in the day, it came to life, and it ran through the message store from the point it last finished. It started at a watermark from yesterday and combed through every transaction in the message store, up until the next watermark.

“A lot of the messages in there were nonsense, because there was no data dictionary, there was no API that enforced message integrity. The contents of the message were freehand, you could write whatever you wanted in the code, and everybody did it differently. And then, when you came back three weeks later, you could write it differently again.”

He gave an example of a message stored previously when a customer bought a stamp. It was feasible that a new message for buying a stamp weeks later could be slightly different.

“When the cash count came along, it found a message it was not expecting and either ignored it, tripped up, or added something it shouldn’t be adding,” he said.

In 2015, Computer Weekly reported another anonymous source who identified the cash writing program as a possible cause of serious problems. He told us the Post Office was warned about the risk of data corruption on the bespoke asynchronous communication system which sent messages between branches and the central Horizon set-up.

Speaking to Computer Weekly in 2015, the anonymous source told us: “The asynchronous system did not communicate in real time, but does so using a series of messages that are stored and forwarded, when the network connection is available. This means that messages to and from the centre may trip over each other. It is perfectly possible that, if not treated properly, messages from the centre may overwrite data held locally.”

Four years later, former Fujitsu engineer Richard Roll wrote in a witness statement to the High Court: “The issues with coding in the Horizon system were extensive. Furthermore, the coding issues impacted on transaction data and caused financial discrepancies on the Horizon system at branch level.”

Roll’s evidence, which was accepted by the judge, suggests that the problems with Horizon identified by our source had not been dealt with by the time the system went live.

Other experts familiar with Horizon that Computer Weekly approached have also supported the developer’s claims.

The developer said he made his superiors at Fujitsu aware of the extent of the Epos system problems, telling them explicitly that the cash account needed to be scrapped.

“I broke it down and said: you can keep these bits at a push if you have to,” he said. “But that bit in the middle, these bits of the engine, the gearbox, you need to throw them away and rebuild them. Starting with the cash account. You’ve got to throw the cash account away and you’ve got to rewrite it.”

Full article
www.computerweekly.com
www.computerweekly.com
 
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@Chippy_Tea Fujitsu knew from the beginning that the system didn't work properly but the point I was trying to make was that the PO also knew and continued with prosecutions after this. I think they stated that they were told by Fujitsu before 2010 but were still allowing prosecutions to proceed as late as 2015 and Fujitsu was still providing them with the evidence for these prosecutions in 2015.

To me, they are equally to blame for anything that happened after 2010 as both companies knew by then. Instead of covering things up, they should have paused the prosecutions until they knew the evidence was reliable. However, both parties proceeded as if everything was fine and not the shitshow that it actually was.
 
There's tons of wrong doing going on,maybe not on this scale,but people being forced into lower wages,worse terms and conditions and sh1thouse management. And before some bright spark pipes up...its not as simple as "if you don't like it.."
 
I agree with all of MattH1973's post above but...

Linked to the part quoted above, didn't a Fujitsu employee say this week that they provided evidence to assist the PO with the prosecutions when both the PO and Fujitsu knew that the system had bugs in it and the data upon which the prosecutions were based was flawed? Prosecutions were still ongoing in 2015. Why the hell didn't someone either at Fujitsu or the PO shout out that they had to pause the prosecutions as the evidence was flawed?

thanks Pavros - this is a great point. I had missed that, by assisting with prosecutions Fujitsu have questions to answer regarding whether they knew these prosecutions had the effect of hiding the issues with the system. If this is the case, then you make a good point regarding Fujitsu liability.

I still think, as the initiator of the prosecutions, the PO liability is higher - but you are right that gap may be narrowing....

It's been a week to focus on Fujitsu as they have appeared at the select cttee and the inquiry this week. I wonder how this will all feel when the PO Execs from the time appear.....
 
I fear this will be the end of what has been and should be a great British institution
i take the spirit of your point, but this scandal suggests it hasn't been a great institution for more than 20 years. It is odd the affection with which state institutions are held, considering in so many cases how lamentable their performance is. There are many other hopeless state institutions, of course. Our ruling classes have a lot to answer for.
 
I see they even edited witness statements, i am sorry but these feckers who did this need to be jailed and lose their pensions and any other perks they get, there is no way they should be able to walk away

Yep, it's astonishing that litigation officers in the post office AND post office lawyers would take a witness statement from a supplier and purposely remove details about known error logs and bugs just to suit their prosecution narrative
Those that edited the statements should face jail time.
 

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